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1. Introduction 
Over the last three decades, the European Union (EU) has seen an in-
crease in the number of agencies that have been set up within its institutional 
framework and started what today is known as a process of «agencifica-
tion». 1 At present, more than 40 agencies carry out diverse and very specific 
tasks, depending on the reason for their establishment. The rapid prolifera-
tion of these institutions can be explained by the belief of the political play-
ers in the European Union that agencies have a very important role in im-
plementing the policies of the Union, 2 and allow these political players (in 
particular the Commission) to focus on other core tasks. 3 The agencies per-
 
 
1 M. CHAMON, EU Agencies: Does the Meroni Doctrine make sense?, in Maastricht J. 
Eur. Comp. L., Vol. 17, Issue 3, 2010, pp. 281-305. 
2 M. VAN RIJSBERGEN, On the Enforceability of EU Agencies’ Soft Law at the National 
Level: The Case of the European Securities and Markets Authority, in Utrecht L. Rev., Vol. 
10, Issue 5, 2014, pp. 116-131. 
3 M. VAN RIJSBERGEN, op. cit. 
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form functions such as monitoring, gathering of information, drafting re-
ports, providing technical advice, drafting recommendations, and they also 
have regulatory powers. 4 Not every agency is directly involved in the EU 
administrative framework; however, when they are, two main trends can be 
discerned: agencies can, among other things, engage in the adoption of bind-
ing instruments or issue soft law guidance. 5  
The legal basis for European Union agencies is not contained in the 
Treaties, nor is there any provision which explicitly governs the capacity 
of the Commission to delegate powers to them. 6 As a matter of fact, these 
institutions are created by secondary law (namely Regulations) and their 
powers are delineated by the case law of the European Court of Justice 
(CJEU). In particular, the Meroni judgement, 7 which was delivered in 
1958, stated that EU actors can only delegate clearly defined executive 
powers to the agencies, to the exclusion of discretionary ones. This seems 
to imply that general regulatory powers cannot indeed be delegated. 8 
However, as previously noted, more and more agencies are involved in the 
drafting of various kinds of soft law (such as recommendations, guidelines 
or opinions) which is general in nature. Since soft law is not formally bind-
ing and, thus, does not create any rights or obligations, it seems to escape 
the limitations established by the Meroni judgement. Yet, the importance 
of soft law must not be underestimated, as it may have considerable practi-
cal effects. 9 Indeed, the Court of Justice itself has underlined the relevance 
that soft law promulgated by agencies might have in interpreting the sec-
ondary law of the Union. 10 An important development that should be men-
 
 
4 M. VAN RIJSBERGEN, op. cit. 
5 E. CHITI, European Agencies’ Rulemaking: Powers, Procedures and Assessment, in 
Eur. L.J., Vol. 19, Issue 1, 2013, pp. 93-110. 
6 A. FORGACS, The Regulatory Powers of Agencies in the United States and the European 
Union, in Eur. Networks L. Reg. Q., Vol. 3, Issue 11, 2015, pp. 11-24. 
7 CJEU, 13 June 1958, Case 9/56, Meroni & Co., Industrie Metallurgiche, S.A.S., v High 
Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community, ECLI:EU:C:1958:7. 
8 T. VAN DEN BRINK-L. SENDEN, Checks and Balances of Soft EU Rule-making, study for 
the Directorate General for Internal Policies, policies department C: citizens’ rights and con-
stitutional affairs, 2012, PE 462.433. 
9 T. VAN DEN BRINK-L. SENDEN, Checks and Balances of Soft EU Rule-making, cit. 
10 See for example: CJEU, 10 september 2015, Case C-106/14, Fédération des entre-
prises du commerce et de la distribution (FCD) and Fédération des magasins de bricolage 
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tioned is the recent ESMA-short selling case, 11 which brought a number of 
changes to the doctrine developed in Meroni. In this judgement the CJEU 
ruled that it is possible to delegate the power to adopt acts of general ap-
plication to EU agencies if those acts are amenable to judicial review. 12 
Yet, in Belgium v Commission 13 the Court made it clear that non-binding 
acts are hardly open to judicial review.  
Because of the implications of the ESMA-short selling judgement, it is 
clear that there is a general lack of ex post control in regards to soft law 
measures issued by the European Union agencies, which, in turn, makes it 
essential to have at least some form of ex ante control. It is important to un-
derline the fact that these two mechanisms operate in different ways and 
have unique functions which cannot be replaced by each other. However, the 
evident absence of the first shifts attention to the empirical need to test the 
second. This means that the procedure that leads to the adoption of soft law 
becomes an important factor in establishing the legitimacy of the soft law-
making of the agencies. 
There is extensive literature concerning the EU agencies, which covers 
their history, independence and legitimacy. 14 However, when discussing the 
independence of the agencies, the existing studies concentrate on the auton-
omy that these bodies have in relation to the EU institutions, the accounta-
bility of their actions and their possible abuse of power, all in relation to 
hard law measures issued by them. The literature about legitimacy is also 
limited to the hard law regulatory powers framework of the agencies. This 
leaves the substantial gap of establishing the legitimacy of the soft law-
 
 
et de l’aménagement de la maison (FMB) v Ministre de l’Écologie, du Développement du-
rable et de lʼÉnergie, ECLI :EU:C:2015:576, para. 28. 
11 CJEU, 22 January 2014, Case 270/12, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland v European Parliament and Council of the European Union (ESMA-short selling), 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:18. 
12 CJEU, ESMA-short selling, cit., para. 53. 
13 GC, 27 October 2015, Case T-721/14, Kingdom of Belgium v European Commission, 
ECLI:EU:T:2015:829. 
14 See for example: R. DEHOUSSE, Regulation by networks in the European Community: 
the role of European agencies, in J. Eur. Pub. Pol’y, Vol. 4, Issue 2, 1997, pp. 246-261; A. 
WONKA-B. RITTBERGER, Credibility, Complexity and Uncertainty: Explaining the Institu-
tional Independence of 29 EU Agencies, in West Eur. Pol., Vol. 33, Issue 4, 2010, pp. 730-
752. M. BUSUIOC-D. CURTIN-M. GROENLEER, Agency growth between autonomy and ac-
countability: the European Police Office as a ‘living institution’, in J. Eur. Pub. Pol’y, Vol. 
18, Issue 6, 2011, pp. 848-867. 
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making of EU agencies. As mentioned, soft law is an extremely important 
tool often used by EU institutions and agencies, which frequently creates 
practical effects. However, in spite of its significance, research on soft law 
in relation to European Union agencies is lacking. Only very few authors, 
mostly Chiti, van den Brink and Senden and Korkea-aho (this last focusing 
on the ECHA), 15 have touched upon the procedural framework for the adop-
tion of soft law by the agencies. In this regard, it is also worth mentioning 
the recent study published by Vos, 16 which presents an overview of all EU 
agencies, discussing various key points such as their legal basis, constitu-
tionalisation, relationship with EU institutions and stakeholders, parliamen-
tary scrutiny and delegation of powers. However, this document does not 
have a specific focus on soft law in particular. One final piece of research 
to be mentioned is that of Vaughan, 17 which focuses on 14 agencies, but 
mainly discusses the unclear nature of the guidance of the agencies, the 
forms and lengths of the documents and difficulties in accessing them be-
cause of poorly organised websites. This research, therefore, attempts to 
fill this gap by providing an analysis of the way in which the European Un-
ion agencies produce soft law, with a view to inferring the extent to which 
the process is legitimate. The research, therefore, aims at contributing to 
the existing literature on EU agencies by analysing, in the setting of soft 
law, the existence (or otherwise) of sufficient ex ante control mechanisms 
over the power of the agencies to issue soft law, given the lack of ex post 
checks.  
Today, in practice, most EU agencies issue some kind of soft law; how-
ever, there are in particular 20 agencies 18 whose founding Regulation ex-
 
 
15 See E. CHITI, op. cit., T. VAN DEN BRINK-L. SENDEN, op. cit., and E. KORKEA-AHO, 
Laws in Progress? Reconceptualizing Accountability Strategies in the Era of Framework 
Norms, in Transnat’l Envtl. L., Vol. 2, Issue 2, 2013, pp. 363-385.  
16 E. VOS, Eu Agencies, Common Approach and Parliamentary Scrutiny, Study, Europe-
an Parliamentary Research Service, 2018.  
17 S. VAUGHAN, Differentiation and Dysfunction: An Exploration of Post-Legislative 
Guidance Practices in 14 EU Agencies, in Cambridge Y.B. Eur. L.Stud., Vol. 17, 2015, pp. 
66-91. 
18 The agencies are: EUIPO (European Union Intellectual Property Office), CPVO 
(Community Plant Variety Office), ECHA (European Chemical Agency), EBA (European 
Banking Authority), EIOPA (European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority), 
ESMA (European Securities and Markets Authority), ESRB (European Systemic Risk 
Board), EMA (European Medicines Agency), EFSA (European Food and Safety Authority), 
EMSA (European Maritime Safety Agency), EASA (European Aviation Safety Agency), 
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plicitly gives them the power to issue soft law. The scope of this contribu-
tion will be limited to the study of those 20 agencies. The contribution will 
analyse the founding Regulations of the selected European agencies and 
their rules of procedures, where they exist. In order to evaluate their level of 
legitimacy, this contribution starts with an analysis of the degree of details 
and precision of the procedures that lead to the issuing of soft law by each 
agency. This is done by looking at three criteria, which are (i) access to doc-
uments, (ii) accountability and (iii) participation, and which constitute indi-
cators of the ‘proceduralisation’ of soft law issuance for each agency. As 
will be explained in Section 2, legitimacy will be evaluated based on these 
three proceduralisation criteria on the premise that the higher the level of 
proceduralisation, the higher the level of legitimacy. Hence, a high, medium, 
or low degree of proceduralisation in the soft law-making powers of the 
agencies selected will correspond, respectively, to a high, medium, or low 
legitimacy of these powers. 
The research will be divided into four main parts. In the next section le-
gitimacy and soft law will be defined, in order to have one standard of eval-
uation for the procedures and one for the selection of the EU agencies which 
are the focus of this contribution. In Section 3, hypotheses will be formulat-
ed on the expected level of legitimacy of the agencies. This will be based on 
an analysis of the different kinds of soft law that each agency issues. Section 
4 examines the levels of proceduralisation of each agency and, based on this, 
evaluates their legitimacy. To conclude, all the relevant findings will be 
summarised and suggestions for future research will be given.  
2. Definitions 
Before delving into the heart of the research, some important concepts 
need to be defined in order to reach the evaluative stage of this contribution 
and reach any conclusions. 
 
 
ENISA (European Network and Information Security Agency), ECDC (European Centre for 
Disease Prevention and Control), ERA (European Railway Agency), ACER (Agency for the 
Cooperation of Energy Regulators), EUROFOUND (European Foundation for the Improve-
ment of Living and Working Conditions), EMCDDA (European Monitoring Centre for 
Drugs and Drug Addiction), FRA (European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights), EDA 
(European Defence Agency), BEREC (Body of European Regulators of Electronic Commu-
nications).  
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First, the notion of legitimacy has to be determined. Schmitter broadly 
phrased the concept as «a shared expectation among actors in an arrange-
ment of asymmetric power such that the actions of those who rule are ac-
cepted voluntarily by those who are ruled because the latter are convinced 
that the actions of the former conform to pre-established norms. Put simply, 
legitimacy converts power into authority and, thereby, establishes simulta-
neously an obligation to obey and a right to rule». 19 
Schmitter’s definition, however, is only helpful for a broad delineation of 
the concept, and is mostly used to elucidate this notion in regard to hard law 
measures, as it would be incorrect to talk about «an obligation to obey» with 
regard to soft law. Most of the authors who have examined the concept of 
legitimacy in the context of the European Union make a more specific dis-
tinction between input, output and throughput legitimacy. 20 Input legitimacy 
refers to the political participation by the people, output legitimacy to the ef-
fectiveness of the policy results for the people, 21 and throughput legitimacy 
to the decision-making and procedural aspects and consists of the compo-
nents of legality, quality and transparency. 22 
While legality is linked to the existence and effectiveness of the rule of 
law (and very rarely creates issues), the quality of decision-making rests on 
the assumption that when a process allows room for discussion, argument, 
mutual learning and reason-giving, the quality of the decision-making pro-
cess is higher than in one consisting of mere bargaining. 23 The last aspect of 
throughput legitimacy, which is the focus of the analysis, is that of transpar-
ency. This concept refers primarily to the access to documents by citizens, 
accountability, participation and openness. 24 In other words, it means that a 
 
 
19 P.C. SCHMITTER, What is there to legitimize in the European Union… and how might 
this be accomplished?. Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna, 2001. 
20 See for example: F.W. SCHARPF, Governing in Europe: Effective and Democratic?. 
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999 and M. ZÜRN, Democratic Governance Beyond the 
Nation-State: The EU and Other International Institutions, in Eur. J. Int’l Rel., Vol. 6, Issue 
2, 2000, pp. 183-221. 
21 V.A. SCHMIDT, Democracy and Legitimacy in the European Union Revisited: Input, 
Output and ‘Throughput, in Pol. Stud., Vol. 6, Issue 1, 2013, pp. 2-22. 
22 R. HOLZHACKER, Democratic Legitimacy and the European Union, in J. Eur. Integra-
tion, Vol. 29, Issue 3, 2007, pp. 257-269. 
23 T. RISSE-M. KLEINE, Assessing the Legitimacy of the EU’s Treaty Revision Methods, in 
J. Com. Mar. St., Vol. 45, Issue 1, 2007, pp. 69-80. 
24 A. ALEMANNO, Unpacking the principle of openness in EU law: transparency, partici-
pation and democracy, in Eur. L. Rev., Vol. 39, Issue 1, 2014, pp. 72-90. 
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process is transparent if, during the decision-making process, it is possible to 
precisely determine who issues the final decision and is therefore accounta-
ble for it, who the stakeholders are who have to be consulted, involved in the 
discussion or drafting of the decision and that there is access of the final 
documents for the public. 25 The concept of openness has a very broad mean-
ing, and the TFEU defines it as the promotion of good governance and par-
ticipation of civil society, 26 which in substance encompasses the abovemen-
tioned components.  
As previously mentioned, this research focuses on the procedural aspect 
of EU soft law-making by European Union agencies. For this reason, the cri-
teria that will be used to evaluate the extent to which those procedures are 
legitimate are the ones ascribed to throughput legitimacy and specifically the 
criterion of transparency. 
This means that, for the purposes of this contribution, there will be a 
high degree of throughput legitimacy when the soft law documents pro-
duced by an agency are accessible to the public in every language of the 
Union, when it is clear who is the body within the agency that is accounta-
ble for the final soft law measure (for example the management or adminis-
trative board or scientific expert groups), and when it is equally clear who 
the stakeholders are who have to be consulted in order to draft the soft law 
document. The degree of transparency will be lower if not all of the soft 
law documents are accessible to the public (or if, for example, individuals 
have to pay for them, register, or availability is limited to certain lan-
guages), when it is not entirely clear who is accountable for the final docu-
ment, and which stakeholders have to be consulted. Consequently, there 
will be no transparency when there is no access to any soft law measure, it 
is impossible to know who is responsible for the final document, and who 
has to be consulted in the process. 
The components of legality and quality will not be tested in the course of 
this research. The reason for excluding the element of legality is that there 
would be a high degree of this when there is a clear legal basis for the issu-
ance of soft law by the EU agencies. Since the contribution focuses on the 
agencies that have the power to issue soft law which specifically stems from 
 
 
25 S. SMISMANS, Regulating interest group participation in the European Union: chang-
ing paradigms between transparency and representation, in Eur. L. Rev., Vol. 39, Issue 4, 
2014, pp. 470-492. 
26 Art. 15(1) TFEU. 
184 Penelope Rocca and Mariolina Eliantonio 
their founding Regulation, it is already clear that there will always be a high 
degree of legality. Therefore, there is no need to further analyse it. The qual-
ity component, on the other hand, will be left out of the scope of this contri-
bution because of the practical difficulty that its analysis implies. In fact, it 
would require an examination of the actual content of each soft law docu-
ment issued and an evaluation of the extent to which their substance has fol-
lowed the discussions and negotiations that led to its drafting and adoption. 
Given the type of analysis required, this criterion will not be tested. Howev-
er it ought to be highlighted that there is certainly a need to conduct further 
research in this regard.  
The second concept that must be defined is that of soft law. Numerous 
definitions have been given for it. Thürer states that it entails «commitments 
which are more than policy statements but less than law in its strict sense. 
They all have in common, without being binding as a matter of law, a cer-
tain proximity to the law or a certain legal relevance». 27 A second definition 
is provided by Snyder, namely «rules of conduct which, in principle, have 
no legally binding force but which nevertheless may have practical ef-
fects». 28 Another definition is given by Senden, who defines soft law as en-
compassing «rules of conduct which are laid down in instruments which 
have not been attributed legally binding force as such, but nevertheless may 
have certain (indirect) legal effects, and that are aimed at and may produce 
practical effects». 29 All of these interpretations have a similar focus, namely 
that the rule must prescribe a conduct or behaviour, it must not be legally 
binding and it may produce some practical effects. Given the affinity of the 
definitions, for the purpose of this contribution the standard used to select 
the EU agencies that issue soft law will be Senden’s description. Therefore, 





27 D. THÜRER, The role of soft law in the actual process of European integration, in O. 
JACOT-GUILLARMOD-P. PESCATORE (eds.), L’avenir du libre-échange en Europe: vers un 
Espace économique européen?, Polygraphischer Verlag, Zürich, 1990, p. 132. 
28 F. SNYDER, The Effectiveness of European Community Law: Institutions, Processes, 
Tools and Techniques, in Mod. L. Rev., Vol. 53, Issue 1, 1993, pp. 19-54. 
29 L. SENDEN, Soft Law in European Community Law. Its relationship with legislation. 
Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2004, p. 104. 
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3. Soft law of the agencies and the hypotheses 
3.1. Different kinds of soft law issued by each agency 
As stated in the previous section, the agencies selected for this study is-
sue soft law as defined by Senden. However, closer examination shows that 
they differ with respect to the kind of soft law that they issue. An analysis of 
the soft law measures issues by the selected EU agencies has made the iden-
tification of four types of soft law possible. 
The first category comprises soft law measures which contain technical 
and specific guidelines which mostly explain requirements for compliance 
with specific EU laws. The EASA, ECHA, EFSA, EBA, EIOPA, ESMA, 
ESRB, BEREC, ACER and EMSA issue soft measures which are part of 
this group. For example, the EASA issues, inter alia, what it refers to as 
«acceptable means of compliance», which are, in fact, soft regulations 
which give guidance on how to implement, use, or interpret more specific 
hard law (such as the Guidance Material on air operations explaining Reg-
ulation 965/2012). On the same line of reasoning, the EMSA also issues 
Technical Recommendations to Member States on how to implement Di-
rectives.  
Second, there are soft law measures which also come in the form of tech-
nical guidelines, but they mainly help explain the steps to be taken in order 
to make an application for an authorisation for a specific sector. Examples of 
this group are the soft law documents issued by the EMA, CPVO and 
EUIPO. For instance, the CPVO has a set of guidelines which indicate the 
steps for how to apply for plant variety protection, the EUIPO for trade mark 
and designs applications and the EMA for preparing marketing authorisa-
tions for human medicines. 
The third group comprises soft law measures aimed at the dissemination 
of comprehensible and high-quality information. These soft law measures 
are issued by the EMCDDA, ECDC, FRA and EDA. A concrete example in 
this respect is the document containing the ECDC guidelines for the surveil-
lance of native mosquitoes in Europe, or that on the EMCDDA guidelines 
on school-based interventions to prevent the uptake of smoking among chil-
dren.  
The last group is composed of soft law measures produced by the ERA, 
EUROFOUND and ENISA. These measures come in the form of technical 
documents mainly addressed to the Commission in order to help it develop 
further EU legislation. For example, the ERA and ENISA, inter alia, draft 
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recommendations on possible amendments to existing Regulations concern-
ing, respectively, the railway and the information security sector. The EU-
ROFOUND soft law is also addressed to the Commission, as it presents it 
with proposals and guidelines for improving the current hard law on, among 
other things, problems specific to certain categories of workers, and long-
term aspects for improvement of the environment and distribution of human 
activities in time and space.  
3.2. Research hypotheses 
In the light of the different types of soft law that the agencies issue, it is 
possible to formulate certain hypotheses regarding the level of legitimacy 
that might be expected from each of them. 
In general, it could be said that the agencies which issue soft law 
measures that are somewhat connected with hard EU law might be expected 
to have a high level of legitimacy. Indeed, these documents serve the pur-
pose of ensuring that hard law is correctly understood and applied by indi-
viduals. If the soft law provisions are drafted in terms which are vague or 
unclear, this might lead to infringements of hard law, because the soft law 
usually clarifies or explains provisions of existing hard law. These infringe-
ments of hard law measures could therefore lead to concrete sanctions. Thus, 
the soft law of agencies that explains what the requirements are for compli-
ance with EU law might be expected to have a high degree of legitimacy. 
However, the soft law of agencies which explains how to submit applica-
tions for an authorisation for a specific sector also clearly has a connection 
with hard law. In fact, the authorisation which triggers the applicability of 
other binding rules is usually issued only if the guidelines prescribed in the 
soft law measures are followed. This means that their legitimacy might also 
be expected to be high. Therefore, the first hypothesis of this study is that 
the soft law issued by the EASA, ECHA, EFSA, EBA, EIOPA, ESMA, 
ESRB, BEREC, ACER, EMSA, EMA, CPVO and EUIPO might be ex-
pected to have a high level of legitimacy. 
The second hypothesis is that the soft law issued by the ERA, EURO-
FOUND and ENISA might be expected to have a medium level of legitima-
cy. Here the soft law instruments remain «internal» to the EU institution 
(because the measures are mainly addressed to the Commission), as they 
could serve as a basis for EU legislation. This means that the soft law also 
has a connection to hard law, but a less close one than that of the last group. 
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In fact, in practice the soft law does not always become the basis of further 
EU legislation and it is not directed primarily to citizens. 
The final hypothesis holds that the soft law issued by the EMCDDA, 
ECDC, FRA and EDA might be expected to have a low level of legitimacy. 
This is because these agencies mainly disseminate high-quality information 
and are not involved with the issuance or compliance with hard law.  
Table 1. – Hypotheses 
Expected level of 
legitimacy 
Soft law which 
explains existing 
hard law 
Soft law which 
explains how to 
submit applications 
for a specific sector
Soft law addressed to 
the Commission and 
serving as basis for 
future hard law 
Soft law which 
disseminates high-
quality information 








Medium   ERA, EUROFOUND, 
ENISA 
 
Low    EMCDDA, ECDC, 
FRA, EDA 
4. Analysis of the procedural frameworks for soft law issuance 
and evaluation of legitimacy 
4.1. Assessment of different levels of proceduralisation  
The 20 agencies have been selected based on the fact that they have been 
granted what can be referred to as a de jure power to issue soft law. In this 
case, this definition means that, among all the EU agencies, those with 
founding Regulations which explicitly grant them the competence to issue 
soft law have been chosen. The decision rests on two main reasons. Firstly, 
those agencies are the ones that produce the most soft law documents if 
compared to the agencies that exercise a de facto power of issuing soft law 
measures. This means that, because of their very prolific activity, the ques-
tion of legitimacy of their procedures poses itself even more powerfully. 
Secondly, the selection is narrow enough to allow an accurate and complete 
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analysis but, at the same time, it encompasses a sufficiently large and di-
verse number of agencies which increases the reliability of the study.  
As mentioned in the introduction, in order to evaluate the legitimacy of 
the procedures for the adoption of soft law of the 20 agencies, an analysis of 
the procedures themselves, based on aspects relating to access to documents, 
accountability and participation has been carried out. This examination was 
based on an analysis of the founding Regulation of each agency selected 
and, where it exists, of their Rules of Procedure, which are internal docu-
ments drafted by the agencies themselves.  
On this basis, it is possible to categorise the agencies into four groups, 
depending on their different levels of proceduralisation. There are agencies 
where the level of proceduralisation is high, since they have both detailed 
rules which prescribe public access to documents, and indicate who is ac-
countable for the soft law documents issued by them, and they have separate 
rules of procedure which explain which stakeholders have to be consulted in 
the decision-making process leading to the issuance of soft law measures. 
On the contrary, some agencies display a low degree of proceduralisation, as 
they have rules about access to documents and accountability, but no rules 
of procedure which explain which stakeholders have to be involved in the 
issuing of soft law. In between those two extremes, two levels have been 
found, a medium-high and a medium-low one. These comprise agencies that 
also have provisions about access to documents and accountability, but 
which have only generic articles in their founding Regulation about consul-
tations for soft law issuance accompanied by rules of procedure of the inter-
nal body which issues soft law (medium-high level). For the medium-low 
subgroup, there are merely articles in the Regulation which provide generic 
indications about the stakeholders to be involved in the decision-making 
process leading to the issuance of soft law measures. 
Those findings are of particular importance as they clearly indicate that 
the main difference at the core of the grouping according to levels of proce-
duralisation (and, hence, also of legitimacy, as these two factors have been 
linked together from the beginning of the research) lies in particular in one 
of the three criteria used, namely participation. In fact, all of the agencies 
generally possess precise and detailed rules which cover access to docu-
ments and accountability aspects. Those rules are similar in all of the agen-
cies. The same is not true for the participation requirement.  
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DOCUMENTS PARTICIPATION ACCOUNTABILITY 
HIGH  Detailed rules which 
prescribe public 
access to documents 
Separate rules of procedure 
for issuing soft law or on the 
stakeholders to be involved in 
the process 
Precise rules which 
indicate the body 
accountable for the soft 
law documents 
MEDIUM-HIGH  Detailed rules which 
prescribe public 
access to documents 
Vague articles in the 
founding Regulation about 
consultations for issuing soft 
law and separate rules of 
procedure of the body of the 
agency which issues soft law
Precise rules which 
indicate the body 
accountable for the soft 
law documents 
MEDIUM-LOW  Rules which 
prescribe public 
access to documents 
Vague articles in the 
founding Regulation about 
the stakeholders to be 
involved in the consultations 
for issuing soft law 
Precise rules which 
indicate the body 
accountable for the soft 
law documents 
LOW  Rules which 
prescribe public 
access to documents 
No rules on participation for 
the process of issuing soft 
law 
Precise rules which 
indicate the body 
accountable for the soft 
law document 
The following subsections specifically analyse the proceduralisation and 
legitimacy of each agency, placing them in their corresponding group based 
on the table above.  
4.2. First group 
The first group comprises the agencies that have a high level of proce-
duralisation. Those are the EASA, EMA, ECHA, EBA, EIOPA and ESMA. 
With regard to the access to documents they all contain articles in their 
founding Regulation stating that Regulation 1049/2001 shall apply. 30 This 
Regulation essentially provides that citizens of the European Union shall 
 
 
30 Regulation (EC) 216/2008, 20 February 2008, [2008] OJ L 79/1, Art. 58. Regulation 
(EC) 726/2004, 31 March 2004, [2004] OJ L 136/1, Art.73. Regulation (EC) 1907/2006, 18 
December 2006, [2006] OJ L 396/1, Art. 118. Regulation (EC) 1093/2010, 24 November 
2010, [2010] OJ L 331/12, Art. 72. Regulation (EC) 1094/2010, 24 November 2010, [2010] 
OJ L 331/48, Art. 72. Regulation (EC) 1095/2010, 24 November 2010, [2010] OJ L 331/84, 
Art. 72. 
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have a right of access to documents of the institution, with «documents» be-
ing defined as any content (regardless of the medium of its expression) 
which falls within the sphere of responsibility of the institution. 31 More spe-
cifically, the EASA also has an explicit obligation to publish in all the offi-
cial languages of the Union the recommendations that it issues to the Com-
mission. 32 The EBA, EIOPA and ESMA have, in their rules of procedure, 
provisions stating that there should be public access to documents produced 
by the stakeholders groups involved in the decision-making process of soft 
law. 33 However, in practice, the soft law documents (which are nonetheless 
available on the official website of the agencies) are accessible only in Eng-
lish. This holds true for the EBA and ECHA as well, the websites of which 
are available in 23 out of the 24 official languages of the EU. 
The EASA, EMA and ECHA furthermore have separate documents 
which specifically lay down detailed provisions concerning the creation of 
soft law. Indeed, the management board of the EASA has published a deci-
sion which contains provisions about the adoption of opinions, certification 
specifications, acceptable means of compliance and guidance material. 34 
This document consists of precise information about how to commence the 
process of rule-making, the drafting of rules, consultations, review of com-
ments, adoption, publication, ex post evaluation and access to those docu-
ments. The EMA, similarly, has also adopted a procedure for guidelines and 
related documents 35 which explains the legal status and the different types 
of guidelines of EMA, and a detailed ten-step process to be followed in 
drafting. The process includes rules about the development of the draft 
measure, the adoption and release for consultation, the preparation of the fi-
 
 
31 Regulation (EC) 1049/2001, 30 May 2001, [2001] OJ L 145/43, Art. 2(1) and 3(a). 
32 Regulation (EC) 216/2008 (n 27), Art. 32(1)(b). 
33 EBA, Rules of Procedure of the Banking Stakeholder Group, 26 October 2015, EBA 
BSG 2015 067, Art. 16. EIOPA, Insurance and Reinsurance Stakeholder Group and Occu-
pational Pensions Stakeholder Group Rules of Procedure, April 2016, EIOPA-16/383, Art. 
15. ESMA, Decision of the Securities and Markets Stakeholder Group Rules of Procedure, 
29 January 2014, ESMA/2014/SMSG/002, Art. 18. 
34 EASA Management Board, Decision n 18-2015 replacing Decision 01/2012 concern-
ing the procedure to be applied by the Agency for the issuing of opinions, certification speci-
fications, acceptable means of compliance and guidance material (‘Rulemaking Proce-
dure’), 15 December 2015. 
35 EMA, Procedure for European Union Guidelines and Related Documents within the 
Pharmaceutical Legislative Framework, 18 March 2009, EMEA/P/24143/2004 Rev. 1 corr. 
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nal version and the implementation phase. The ECHA also adopted a docu-
ment containing a consultation procedure for guidance documents. 36 It con-
tains detailed rules on the commencement of the consultation procedure, the 
ECHA partners, and the precise steps to be taken for issuing guidance. In all 
three documents, it is clear who the stakeholders involved in the process of 
producing the relevant soft law documents are, since the procedural steps are 
laid down in a detailed way and it is possible to discern the different actors 
involved during the different phases. 
The EBA, EIOPA and ESMA all have in their founding Regulation an ar-
ticle which states that, for the adoption of recommendations, «open public 
consultations» shall be held where appropriate with the interested stakehold-
ers. 37 In this regard, each of the agencies have further precise and detailed 
rules of procedure for the respective stakeholder groups. They lay down 
rules about, inter alia, membership, meetings, agenda setting, consultation, 
decision-making, minutes and transparency. 38 The interesting aspect is that 
a detailed description of the composition of those groups is found in the re-
spective Regulations. 39 The description, although very detailed as it lists the 
number and the exact sector from which each member must come, does nev-
ertheless not provide a precise insight into the exact stages in which those 
actors have to be consulted.  
Regarding this last aspect, accountability, all of the agencies have articles 
which empower either the board of supervisors 40 or the management 
board 41 to adopt soft law instruments and, therefore, renders these bodies 
accountable for the soft law issued. 
In summary, all these agencies have precise provisions concerning access 
 
 
36 ECHA Management Board, Second revision to the Consultation Procedure for Guid-
ance, 18 December 2013, MB/63/2013 (final). 
37 Regulation (EC) 1093/2010 (n 27), Art. 16(2). Regulation (EC) 1094/2010 (n 27), Art. 
16(2). Regulation (EC) 1095/2010 (n 27), Art. 16(2). 
38 EBA, Rules of Procedure of the Banking Stakeholder Group (n 30). EIOPA, Insurance 
and Reinsurance Stakeholder Group and Occupational Pensions Stakeholder Group Rules 
of Procedure (n 30). ESMA, Decision of the Securities and Markets Stakeholder Group 
Rules of Procedure (n 30). 
39 Regulation (EC) 1093/2010 (n 27), Art. 37(2). Regulation (EC) 1094/2010 (n 27), Art. 
37(2). Regulation (EC) 1095/2010 (n 27), Art. 37(2). 
40 Regulation (EC) 1093/2010, art. 43. 
41 Regulation (EC) 216/2008 (n 27), Art. 33. Regulation (EC) 726/2004 (n 27), Art. 66. 
Regulation (EC) 1907/2006 (n 27), Art. 78. 
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to documents and accountability, and the rules about participation are also 
generally detailed. Therefore, it can be concluded that, for the purpose of 
this contribution, their level of proceduralisation is high.  
After having analysed the proceduralisation for soft law adoption, it is 
now possible to evaluate the level of transparency (and therefore legitimacy) 
of the agencies that are part of this group. The access to documents aspect is 
present to a medium degree, as the fact that the soft law measures are avail-
able only in English is a consistent limitation. However, accountability and 
participation are characterised by a high level of transparency. This also 
holds true for the EBA, EIOPA and ESMA. The fact that there are no ex-
plicit rules which more clearly lay down each and every step that leads to 
the adoption of the instrument in question renders their rules on participation 
slightly less developed than those of the EASA, EMA and ECHA. Neverthe-
less, the amount of information given allows the public to know the actors 
which contribute to the adoption of soft law, their selection and working 
procedures. This means that these agencies also have a high degree of partic-
ipation. This conclusion is also in line with Vaughan’s findings, 42 where, in 
his paper, he states that these three agencies have a quite detailed way of 
drafting obligations in relation to the guidance that they provide. Therefore, 
it can be concluded that the overall level of legitimacy of the procedures to 
issue soft law of the agencies in this category is high. 
Table 3. – High level of proceduralisation and legitimacy 
AGENCIES ACCESS TO DOCUMENTS PARTICIPATION ACCOUNTABILITY 
EASA, EMA, ECHA Regulation 1049/2001 
applies 
Separate detailed rules of 
procedure on how to 
adopt soft law (including 
the stakeholders to be 
consulted) 
Management board 
EBA, EIOPA, ESMA Regulation 1049/2001 
applies 
Separate rules of 
procedures on the 
stakeholder groups that 
must be consulted when 
issuing soft law 
Board of supervisors 
 
 
42 See S. VAUGHAN, op. cit.  
 European Union Soft Law by Agencies 193 
4.3. Second group 
The second group consists of agencies which have a lower level of pro-
ceduralisation if compared with the first. Part of this category are the BE-
REC, ESRB, CPVO, FRA, ACER and ERA. 
Apart from the ESRB, the rules of procedure of which nonetheless pre-
scribe the publication of all the documents of the agencies approved by the 
General Board in all the EU languages, 43 all the other agencies state that 
Regulation 1049/2001 is, again, applicable. 44 The official websites of the 
ESRB, FRA and ACER are available in the 24 official languages of the EU. 
However, in practice the soft law documents of the agencies that are part of 
this group are available mostly in English only. 
With regards to participation, the common pattern here shows that there 
is generally a vague article in the founding Regulation which provides that 
consultations with interested parties shall be held, accompanied by rules of 
procedure of the body within the agency that specifically issues soft law. 
However, apart from the composition of the relevant body of the agency, it 
is unclear precisely which stakeholders are to be involved in the decision-
making process and it is just as unclear at what stage the stakeholders have 
to be consulted. In other cases, there are articles in the Regulation which in-
dicate quite precisely who the stakeholders are who have to be consulted for 
the drafting of the soft law instrument. However, apart from the designation 
of who needs to be consulted, there is no information about their exact role 
and rules of procedure (and, therefore, at what stage they need to be consult-
ed). The BEREC, for example, states in its founding Regulation that it 
«may, where appropriate, consult the relevant national competition authori-
ties before issuing its opinion to the Commission» 45 and that consultations 
with interested parties shall be held before issuing soft law. 46 Moreover, it 
states that the Board of Regulators, whose composition is laid down in Arti-
cle 4(2), shall issue soft law. 47 In this respect, there are precise rules of pro-
 
 
43 ESRB, Rules of Procedure of the European Systemic Risk Board, 20 January 2011, 
ESRB/2011/1, Art. 27(1). 
44 Regulation (EC) 1211/2009, 25 November 2009, [2009] OJ L 337/1, Art. 22. Regula-
tion (EC) 168/2007, 15 February 2007, [2007] OJ L 53/1, Art. 17. Regulation (EC) 2100/94, 
27 July 1994, [1994] OJ L 227/1, Art. 33a. Regulation (EC) 713/2009, 13 July 2009, [2009] 
OJ L 211/1, Art. 30. Regulation (EC) 881/2004, 29 April 2004, [2004] OJ L 164/1, Art. 37. 
45 Regulation (EC) 1211/2009 (n 40), Art. 3(3). 
46 Regulation (EC) 1211/2009, Art. 17. 
47 Regulation (EC) 1211/2009, Art. 5(1). 
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cedure of the Board of Regulators which, however, cannot be accessed un-
less a person is registered on the official page. 48 In any case, there are no 
other indications about the nature and role of these interested parties. The 
ESRB is a little more precise as, in its rules of procedure, it indicates specif-
ically the entities from which it can seek advice before drafting guidelines. 49 
Yet, again, there is no information about their role in the decision-making 
process. The same could be said for the ACER and the ERA. For example, 
the founding Regulation of ACER specifically indicates that, in particular 
before drafting guidelines, the agency «shall consult extensively and at an 
early stage with market participants, transmission system operators, con-
sumers, end-users and, where relevant, competition authorities». 50 However, 
differently from the other agencies in this group, the ACER and ERA do not 
have any separate relevant rules of procedure nor do they indicate more pre-
cisely at what stage the stakeholders have to be consulted. 
With regards to accountability, all the agencies refer to one of their inter-
nal bodies as the one adopting the opinions or recommendations, which is 
therefore the organ accountable for them. 51 
Therefore, the agencies in this category are characterised by a medium-
high level of proceduralisation. Despite the fact they all have rules on public 
access to documents and accountability, they are much more vague in rela-
tion to the stakeholders to be involved in the decision-making process. There 
usually is a generic article in the Regulation accompanied by the rules of 
procedure of the body within the agency which issues soft law, or a more 
precise one which indicates the stakeholders to be consulted, but not a de-
tailed description of their involvement. 
Based on the above, it can be concluded that the level of legitimacy of 
these agencies is also medium-high. This is because the access to document 
element of transparency is present to a medium degree, as the soft law doc-
uments are accessible solely in English. On the other hand, there is fully 




Rules-of-procedure.aspx, last accessed 11 July 2018.  
49 ESRB, Rules of Procedure of the European Systemic Risk Board (n 39), Art. 18. 
50 Regulation (EC) 713/2009 (n 40), Art. 10. 
51 Regulation (EC) 1211/2009 (n 40), Art. 5. Regulation (EC) 1092/2010, 24 November 
2010, [2010] OJ L 331/1, Art. 4(2). Regulation (EC) 2100/94 (n 40), Art. 36. Regulation 
(EC) 168/2007 (n 40), Art. 12. Regulation (EC) 713/2009 (n 40), Art. 15. Regulation (EC) 
881/2004 (n 40), Art. 25. 
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first group, but it is nevertheless possible to have quite a considerable insight 
into it, as explained above. 
Table 4. – Medium-high level of proceduralisation and legitimacy 
AGENCIES ACCESS TO DOCUMENTS PARTICIPATION ACCOUNTABILITY 




Vague articles in the 
Regulation stating that 
consultations with 
interested parties must be 
held and separate rules of 
procedure of the body of 
the agency which issues 
soft law 
BEREC: Board of 
Regulators 
ESRB: General Board 
CPVO: Administrative 
Council 
FRA: Management Board 
ACER, ERA Regulation 1049/2001 
applies 
Precise articles in the 
Regulation which clearly 
define the parties to be 
consulted for issuing soft 
law 




4.4. Third group 
The third group comprises agencies that have a lower level of procedural-
isation than the second. These agencies lack any specific set of rules of pro-
cedure for the adoption of soft law and the rules on participation are vague. 
The EMCDDA and EFSA are part of this category. 
With regard to access to documents, the EMCDDA states that the rules of 
Regulation 1049/2001 shall apply, 52 while the EFSA is more vague, affirm-
ing that «the Authority shall ensure wide access to the documents which it 
possesses». 53 It is worth noting that the official website of the EFSA is pre-
sent in four languages of the European Union, namely English, Italian, Ger-
man and French. However, the actual documents containing the guidelines 
are available only in English. The soft law documents of the EMCDDA are 
also available only in English. 
Regarding participation, the rules of the agencies are not clearly defined. 
Article 9 of the Regulation of EFSA, for instance, prescribes open and 
transparent public consultations, but it does not mention whether they must 
 
 
52 Regulation (EC) 1920/2006, 12 December 2006, [2006] OJ L 376/1, Art. 7. 
53 Regulation (EC) 178/2002, 28 January 2002, [2002] OJ L 31/1, Art. 41. 
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be held also for soft law issuance nor who should be the addressees of these 
public consultations. The EMCDDA follows more or less the same line with 
its Article 13(2). It states that the Scientific Committees, before delivering 
an opinion, shall take into consideration opinions expressed by national ex-
perts, with no further elaboration. 
In terms of the accountability aspect, the management board and the ex-
ecutive director are accountable for the soft law documents of, respectively, 
the EMCDDA and the EFSA. 54 
Therefore, given the vagueness of the articles contained in the Regula-
tions regarding stakeholders’ involvement in consultations, these agencies 
are deemed to have a medium-low level of proceduralisation.  
For the assessment of legitimacy, in spite of the relatively high degrees of 
the elements of access to documents and accountability, it can also be con-
cluded that the procedure for the adoption of soft law of these two agencies 
is characterised by rather little transparency (medium-low level), as there is 
virtually no insight into the participation aspect. 
Table 5. – Medium-low level of proceduralisation and legitimacy 
AGENCIES ACCESS TO DOCUMENTS PARTICIPATION ACCOUNTABILITY 
EMCDDA, EFSA EMCDDA: Regulation 
1049/2001 applies EFSA: 
wide access to documents 
EMCDDA: opinions of national 
experts must be taken into 
account 
EFSA: open and transparent 
public consultations shall be held






4.5. Fourth group 
The fourth and last group comprises the ENISA, ECDC, EMSA, EURO-
FOUND, EDA and EUIPO. Those agencies are characterised by a low level 
of proceduralisation for soft law-making. 
For the access to documents aspect, they all make reference to Regulation 
1049/2001. 55 The ENISA official website is available in four languages of 
 
 
54 Regulation (EC) 1920/2006 (n 48), Art. 9. Regulation (EC) 178/2002 (n 49), Art. 26. 
55 Regulation (EC) 526/2013, 21 May 2013, [2013] OJ L 165/41, Art. 18. Regulation 
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the EU, namely English, French, German and Greek. The websites of the 
EUROFOUND and EUIPO are available, respectively, in 28 languages (in-
cluding 4 which are not official languages of the European Union) and 23 
official ones. However, for the first two agencies the soft law documents are 
only accessible in English, while for the EUIPO the guidelines are available 
in English, French, German, Italian and Spanish. The EUIPO website also 
states that guidelines which entered into force before 2014 are accessible in 
all the languages of the EU, and that by the end of 2018 all of them are to be 
made available in all the EU languages. 56  
Regarding participation, their proceduralisation is almost inexistent. In 
fact, none of the founding Regulations of the agencies refer to consultations 
with stakeholders or procedures to be followed for the adoption of guide-
lines. In the same way they lack separate rules for the adoption of soft law. 
Agencies such as the ECDC, ENISA and EMSA merely give general indica-
tions of commitment to the principle of transparency in relation to the pro-
cedures of the agency and open access to documents. 57 
In terms of accountability, on the other hand, they refer to the manage-
ment board, 58 governing board, 59 head of the agency, 60 administrative 
board 61 or the president of the office. 62 
In spite of the existence of rules on access to documents and accountabil-
ity, these agencies are considered to have a low level of proceduralisation. 
They do not have any rule (generic or specific) which indicates any of the 
steps of the procedure to be followed for the adoption of soft law. 
In the light of this analysis, it can be said that, generally, the access to 
documents aspect of legitimacy is present to a medium degree (even if it is 
 
 
(EC) 851/2004, 21 April 2004, [2004] OJ L 142/1, Art. 20. Regulation (EC) 1406/2002, 14 
June 2002, [2002] OJ L 208/1, Art. 4. Regulation (EC) 1365/75, 26 May 1975, [1975] OJ L 
139/1, Art. 18a. Regulation (EC) 2015/1835, 12 October 2015, [2015] OJ L 266/55, Art. 30. 
Regulation (EC) 2017/1001, 14 June 2017, [2017] OJ L 154/1, Art. 149. 
56 See: https://euipo.europa.eu/ohimportal/en/trade-mark-guidelines, last accessed 11 July 
2018. 
57 Regulation (EC) 1406/2002 (n 51), preamble 9 and Art. 4. Regulation (EC) 851/2004 
(n 51), preamble 14 and 19 and Art. 20. Regulation (EC) 526/2013 (n 51), preamble 18 and 
Art. 16 and 18. 
58 Regulation (EC) 526/2013 (n 51), Art. 5. Regulation (EC) 851/2004 (n 51), Art. 14. 
59 Regulation (EC) 1365/75 (n 51), Art. 7. 
60 Regulation (EC) 2015/1835 (n 51), Art. 7. 
61 Regulation (EC) 1406/2002 (n 51), Art. 10. 
62 Regulation (EC) 207/2009, 26 February 2009, [2009] OJ L 78/1, Art. 89. 
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higher for the EUIPO), while accountability is present to the highest degree. 
However, there is an extremely low degree of participation. Therefore, it can 
be concluded that these agencies have an overall low level of legitimacy.  
Table 6. – Low level of proceduralisation and legitimacy 





No separate rules of procedure for 
adoption of soft law nor articles in the 
Regulation about consultations 
EUROFOUND: Governing 
Board 
EDA: Head of the Agency 






General articles in the Regulation about 
the transparency of the agencies’ 
procedures  




4.6. Discussion  
From the above subdivision and analysis, it is possible to provide an 
overview of the level of proceduralisation and legitimacy of the process of 
soft law-making of the selected EU agencies. 
The first and last categories are the ones which diverge the most. In fact, 
for the purpose of this study, the former group is characterised by a high 
level of legitimacy. On the other hand, the latter has a low level of legitima-
cy. Regarding the two remaining groups, which have been placed between 
the two extremes, it could be said that they are nonetheless closer to the cat-
egory with the lowest level of proceduralisation and legitimacy. This is be-
cause, apart from the access to documents and accountability aspects, they 
provide little information about participation. They have no rules about the 
procedure to be followed for adopting soft law and they merely refer, more 
or less precisely, to consultations to be held with national authorities or 
stakeholders. 
In the light of the findings, it is now possible to look at whether the hy-
potheses proposed above have been confirmed or refuted. It is clear that 
none of the three hypotheses have been fully confirmed. 
It was expected that the EASA, ECHA, EFSA, EBA, EIOPA, ESMA, 
ESRB, BEREC, ACER, EMSA, EMA, CPVO and EUIPO would have high 
levels of legitimacy. However, only the EASA, ECHA, EBA, EIOPA, ES-
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MA and EMA confirm this hypothesis. The BEREC, ESRB, ACER and 
CPVO are part of the category with a medium-high level of legitimacy. In 
this case, it could be argued that expectations have not been met by a small 
margin of error, since the latter agencies still fit into the second highest cat-
egory. However, as is clear from the above analysis, there is a considerable 
‘procedural gap’ between the first and the other three categories. In fact, the 
two middle groups are closer to the lowest one in terms of their level of pro-
ceduralisation and legitimacy. Moreover, the EUIPO and EMSA find them-
selves in the category with low legitimacy, and the EFSA in the one with a 
medium-low level. This clearly confutes the first hypothesis. 
The second hypothesis held that the ERA, EUROFOUND and ENISA 
were expected to have a medium level of legitimacy in their procedures to 
issue soft law. This hypothesis has also not been fully confirmed. First, it is 
worth noting that, in the end, two medium categories have been found. The 
ERA is part of the group of agencies which have a medium-high level of le-
gitimacy, which could be seen as a confirmation of the expectation related to 
it. However, both the ENISA and EUROFOUND have a low level of legiti-
macy. This refutes clearly the second hypothesis. 
Last, the third hypothesis expected the EMCDDA, ECDC, FRA and 
EDA to have low levels of legitimacy. This has also been just partially con-
firmed. In fact, the ECDC and EDA are part of the last category, with low 
levels of legitimacy, which validates the hypothesis. However, the FRA and 
EMCDDA have medium levels. In particular, the former has a medium-high 
while the latter a medium-low level of legitimacy of the procedures to issue 
soft law.  
Table 7. – Actual findings 
Actual level 
of legitimacy 
Soft law which 
explains existing 
hard law 
Soft law which 
explains how to 
submit applications 
for a specific sector
Soft law addressed to 
the Commission and 
serving as basis for 
future hard law 
Soft law which 
disseminates high-
quality information 
High EASA, ECHA, EBA, 
EIOPA, ESMA 
EMA   
Medium-high BEREC, ESRB, ACER CPVO ERA FRA 
Medium-low EFSA   EMCDDA 
Low EMSA EUIPO ENISA, 
EUROFOUND 
ECDC, EDA 
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The general observation that can be made by looking at these results is 
that there seems to be no apparent logical pattern for the degree of legitima-
cy of the procedures to issue soft law of the selected 20 agencies. In fact, 
even though part of the hypotheses has been confirmed, it seems rather to be 
a confirmation by chance. In relation to the first hypothesis, out of 13 agen-
cies only six fitted in the expected category. The rest were part of the re-
maining groups (four were in the category with medium-high legitimacy, 
one medium-low and two low). The second hypothesis has been confirmed 
by only one out of three agencies. The third by two out of four.  
It is clear that, out of the three criteria used for the classification, the one 
of participation is particularly important. In fact, the access to documents 
and accountability aspects are present, in each group, roughly to the same 
extent, while the procedures explaining the participation of different stake-
holders in the process of soft law creation differ consistently from group to 
group. This procedural difference, as just mentioned, does not seem to be 
dictated by the different kinds of soft law that each agency drafts. It is worth 
noting that the subdivision is not even governed by a temporal criterion. In 
fact, it could perhaps be expected that the agencies that are part of the first 
group were the most recently founded (in order to explain an improvement 
to recent criticism about legitimacy concerns). However, this is not the case. 
The EBA, EIOPA and ESMA were founded in 2011 and the ECHA in 2007, 
but the EASA was instituted in 2003 and the EMA as early as 1995. This 
considerable difference between the years of foundation of the agencies is 
present in all the four subgroups under examination. It might perhaps be in-
teresting in future research to assess whether this subdivision can be ex-
plained by the different degrees (if they exist) of institutional accountability 
of the agencies, meaning their accountability before representing institutions 
(such as the Council and the European Parliament). This examination would 
have to be based on an analysis of the different accountability stages, such 
as the verification of whether an agency has an obligation to justify its con-
duct, whether it has to report it to other institutions, and the rectification 
stage, where the agency has to face the consequences of its conduct. 
The findings of this contribution have serious implications. It has been 
shown how most of the agencies (14 out of 20) possess quite a low level of 
legitimacy for their procedure to issue soft law. It could therefore be said 
that only the six agencies of the first group have a level of legitimacy which 
is high enough to serve the purpose of being an effective ex ante control 
over their power to issue soft law. This means that the majority of agencies 
lacks effective ex ante and ex post controls. As mentioned in the introduc-
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tion, soft law is an important tool which involves significant practical ef-
fects. It is because of these effects that legitimate and, in particular, trans-
parent procedures are needed. Individuals are entitled to know how and by 
whom these documents are produced, in order to be able to exercise a form 
of control over possibly arbitrary decisions, fostering legal certainty and 
democratic beliefs. This research therefore provides tangible proof of a need 
to implement more transparent and legitimate procedures for the adoption of 
soft law by European Union agencies. 
5. Conclusion 
Because of their number and increasing scope of activities, EU agencies 
have become more and more important in the system of EU administrative 
governance. Their powers and responsibilities, however, are not clearly reg-
ulated in the Treaties of the Union, and are only enshrined in secondary law. 
When referring to soft law, in particular, the issue of conferral of powers and 
ex post control over the tasks of the agencies show how these powers are es-
sentially unregulated. Hence the importance of discovering whether some 
form of ex ante control exists over the power to issue soft law by the agen-
cies. Based on the foregoing, this research analysed the procedural frame-
work of 20 selected agencies in order to infer how legitimate the process is. 
Three hypotheses were created based on the level of legitimacy that 
might have been expected from each agency. In order to do so, the soft law 
issued by each agency has been analysed. The agencies where soft law has a 
strong link with EU hard law were predicted to have a high level of legiti-
macy, while the ones which merely disseminate high-quality information 
were expected to have a low one. In between there were agencies whose link 
with hard law is weaker than the first group, but nonetheless present. 
None of these three hypotheses has been fully confirmed. It has been found 
that the agencies can be grouped into four different categories based on the 
different level of proceduralisation for the issuance of soft law and, conse-
quently, also of legitimacy. In fact, these two factors have been linked togeth-
er from the beginning of the research by using the same criteria of evaluation 
for both (namely access to documents, participation and accountability).  
Only six agencies have a high level of legitimacy, while according to the 
hypotheses there should have been 13. The ones that come into this catego-
ry, the EASA, EMA, ECHA, EBA, EIOPA and ESMA, display fully fledged 
participation. These agencies either have separate precise rules of procedure 
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expressly created for the adoption of soft law, or they have rules of proce-
dures for the stakeholders groups to be consulted. In general, the access to 
documents aspect is present to a medium degree in relation to each of the 
four groups and accountability to the highest degree. Therefore, the element 
of participation played a particularly important role in the analysis.  
The three other categories display a medium-high, medium-low and low 
degree of transparency (and therefore legitimacy). The BEREC, ESRB, 
ACER, CPVO, ERA and FRA are part of the second group, with a medium-
high level of transparency. These agencies are characterised by either pre-
cise articles in the founding Regulation defining the stakeholders to be con-
sulted, or more vague articles about consultation, accompanied by rules of 
procedure of the internal body of the agency empowered to issue soft law 
measures. Part of the third group, with a medium-low level of legitimacy, 
are the EFSA and EMCDDA. Their rules on participation do not display 
precise information, but merely refer to open and public consultations or 
consultations with national experts. Last, the ENISA, ECDC, EMSA, EU-
ROFOUND, EDA and EUIPO are part of the fourth group, with a low level 
of legitimacy, as they only mention commitments to the principle of trans-
parency with no further elaboration. 
In spite of the categorisation, it can be said that the procedural gap be-
tween the last three groups and the first one is substantial. This means that 
the agencies of the first group can be said to be the only ones whose level of 
transparency is adequate in order to provide an actual control mechanism 
over the power of the agencies to issue soft law.  
Therefore, the research showed how, as of today, the procedural frame-
work of the majority of the 20 selected agencies provides for little transpar-
ency. Furthermore, it has been shown that four different levels of legitimacy 
can be identified, meaning that the selected agencies display some quite sig-
nificant differences with regard to this aspect. However, their categorisation 
in terms of proceduralisation does not appear to be dictated by any logical 
pattern. Instead, the fact that all three hypotheses have been refuted shows 
that there is no discernible link between the transparency of the procedures 
to issue soft law, and the kind of soft law issued by the selected EU agen-
cies. It can thus be concluded that there is a general need to enhance trans-
parency and legitimacy in the process of soft law creation by the European 
Union agencies. Based on the foregoing, it could be beneficial to have a 
more homogeneous and streamlined framework for all the processes of soft 
law-making of the agencies. Such a solution could clearly enhance legal cer-
tainty, which is fundamental in terms of predictability of the actions of those 
 European Union Soft Law by Agencies 203 
subjected to the (soft) law, and more democratic procedures. In this regard, a 
perhaps relevant source of inspiration for the improvement of transparency 
could be the ReNEUAL Model Rules on EU Administrative Procedure. 63 
Those rules are draft proposals for legislation which take into consideration 
and try to reinforce general principles of EU law, among which we find 
transparency and legal certainty. 64 They have been drafted in relation to 
hard European law; however, it might be interesting to see whether they 
could also be applied regarding procedures for soft law-making or, if not, to 
try to draw on them. The Model Rules seem, indeed, to set precise standards 
regarding, inter alia, the procedures through which to achieve a greater in-
volvement of citizens and enterprises in order to deepen the culture of par-
ticipation, and to promote the duties of providing reasons and disclosure. 65 
The application of those rules could undoubtedly benefit the transparency 
deficit of the agencies that are part of the second, third and fourth group, but 
could also be of use, if applied to all the agencies, for harmonisation purposes.  
The present research focused on 20 agencies, being the ones that have 
been granted a de jure power to issue soft law. This is a limit of this contri-
bution, as there are in total more than 40 agencies in the EU. This means 
that, in order to complete the picture, further research is needed to find out 
how legitimate the procedural framework for soft law creation is in relation 
to the agencies that have a de facto competence to promulgate soft law. 
Moreover, this contribution concentrated on the transparency aspect of legit-
imacy, leaving aside the component of legality and quality. Further research 
is therefore needed in order to test the quality component in relation to the 
present 20 agencies and to those issuing de facto soft law. One last caveat 
regards the theoretical approach of this contribution. This research has been 
carried out by looking at secondary and, mainly, primary sources in relation 
to the different agencies. However, these results should be subsequently 
tested empirically, 66 in order to find out in concreto how difficult it is to get 
information about soft law-making from each agency. 
 
 
63 P. CRAIG-H.C.H. HOFMANN-J. SCHNEIDER-J. ZILLER (eds.), ReNEUAL Model Rules on 
EU Administrative Procedure, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014. 
64 P. CRAIG-H.C.H. HOFMANN-J. SCHNEIDER-J. ZILLER (eds.), ReNEUAL Model Rules on 
EU Administrative Procedure, Book II- Administrative Rule-Making. 
65 P. CRAIG-H.C.H. HOFMANN-J. SCHNEIDER-J. ZILLER (eds.), ReNEUAL Model Rules on 
EU Administrative Procedure, Art. II-4 and II-5. 
66 The only empirical test concluded so far had been carried out by Korkea-aho in rela-
tion to the ECHA. See E. KORKEA-AHO, op. cit. 
